As in 1994 on the question of European Union (EU) membership, there is a split between transnational sector unions supporting European Monetary Union (EMU) and national production sector unions rejecting it. Interestingly, however, transnational production sector unions, as well as trade union confederations, no longer combine their support for membership with a strong emphasis on Europe-wide cooperation and the demand for further development of the Social Dimension. A neo-Gramscian perspective amended with a strategicrelational approach to the state is used for the analysis. While the split in the labour movement on EMU can be explained through a reference to the impact of globalization, the renewed focus of transnational labour on the Swedish form of state is due to the re-strengthened cooperation with capital at the national level and a strong economic performance of Sweden in the late 1990s as well as in 2000 and 2001. 
European Central Bank (ECB) has as its sole task the maintenance of price stability and low inflation, setting the interest rates accordingly. Related coordinated fiscal policies by the member states support this through an emphasis on balanced budgets and low national debt levels (Jones, 2002: 37-40) . In 1994, the Swedish labour movement was split over the question of EU membership (Bieler, 1999) , with the neo-liberal restructuring of the EU at the heart of the dispute. On the one hand, public sector unions such as the Municipal Workers' Union and domestic production sector unions such as the Commercial Workers' Union and the Transport Workers' Union, all unions affiliated to the blue-collar Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), were negative about accession to the EU. The neo-liberal rationale behind European integration would endanger the social democratic achievements of the Swedish Model with its focus on full employment, gender equality in the labour market, a large public sector and a generous welfare state. Membership would require government spending cuts, most likely leading to job losses, especially in the public sector. On the other hand, transnational sector unions such as the Metal Workers' Union, also affiliated to the LO, strongly supported a 'yes' in the referendum. Considering that Swedish transnational corporations (TNCs) had already become a part of the EU through the transfer of production units from Sweden to locations in the EU, it was argued that labour simply had to follow and try to re-establish some control over capital lost at the national level. Nevertheless, the support by transnational sector unions for EU membership in 1994 did not imply that they supported neo-liberal restructuring. Rather, it was an attempt to push for Swedish Model type solutions at the EU level (Bieler, 2000: 120-1) . The Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO), organizing white-collar workers, experienced a similar internal division, and as a result both peak trade unions (LO and TCO) were prevented from making a recommendation prior to the EU referendum. In view of the likely close referendum, the government, employers and pro-EU trade unions left EMU out of the discussion at the time, arguing that this was a matter to be decided upon at a later stage. The scheduled referendum for September 2003 thus revives the discussions about EU membership in 1994.
The purpose of this article is twofold. Firstly, I assess the positions of Swedish trade unions on EMU in light of the forthcoming referendum. I question whether we can observe a split between transnational and national sector unions similar to the division in 1994 in relation to the EU referendum. Secondly, I investigate the question of Europe-wide cooperation with other trade unions. Is possible support for EMU by transnational sector unions linked to increased efforts at cooperation with other unions at the European level with the aim of countering neo-liberal restructuring, and thereby a follow-up on the intentions stated prior to the EU referendum in 1994? The next section is a brief discussion of the conceptual framework used in the article. A neo-Gramscian perspective is contrasted with comparative political economy approaches. I argue that the former is more suitable for the analysis, because it allows us to understand unions as potential international actors and it helps us to examine the underlying rationale of union strategies. I then present an analytical outline of the positions of Swedish trade unions on EMU and assess their attitude on European cooperation, before turning to the Swedish form of state and its impact on unions' level of activity. EMU, however, should not be considered merely as a case study in itself. The importance of macro-economic policy is much broader in that it shapes the overall economic-political model of EMU members as well as the EU as a whole, pressuring towards a marketoriented, neo-liberal model of capitalism. In short, trade union positions on EMU have direct implications for the Swedish and EU model of capitalism. I conclude by considering these implications.
Globalization and the Emergence of Labour as a Transnational Actor
This article is based on the assumption that Swedish trade union positions on EMU have to be understood against the background of the processes of transnational restructuring related to globalization since the early 1970s.
The definition of globalization is widely contested. While so-called internationalists argue that only the levels of exchange between states have intensified, leaving states as the most important actors in international relations (e.g. Weiss, 1998; Hirst and Thompson, 1999) , liberals identify a fundamental structural change characterized by the transnationalization of production and finance and sometimes the emergence of a global civil society (e.g. Strange, 1996; Held et al., 1999; Scholte, 2000) . Although the analysis of globalization and the related changes differ dramatically, in this article I largely follow the liberal conceptualization of globalization. Most importantly, the core features of globalization are first the transnationalization of production, expressed in the organization of production across borders and in the increase in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) levels, as well as the related rise in numbers and importance of TNCs, and second the transnationalization of finance that has led to the emergence of a global, integrated financial market. Additionally, a shift at the ideological level can be identified from Keynesianism, emphasizing the importance of state intervention into the economy to ensure full employment, to neo-liberal economics and its focus on low inflation and price stability (Cox, 1993: 259-60, 266-7) . Comparative political economy approaches regard the production sector as an important variable for the explanation of states' behaviour in the global economy (e.g. Gourevitch, 1986: 54-68; Frieden, 1991: 438) . The response of trade unions and employers' associations to opening up the economy to international competition and the related lobbying pressure on their government depends very much on the nature of the sector. Unions and employers' associations in export sectors tend to favour open borders, while unions and employers' associations in domestic production sectors generally prefer closed borders and state protectionism. This approach has also been employed in the analysis of Sweden's accession to the EU. For example, in focusing on the domestic balance of power between governments and business, Fioretos argues that increasing levels of international economic interdependence have resulted in new domestic coalitions in Sweden dominated by export-oriented companies which demanded EU membership. Accession to the EU was consequently the result of pressure by export companies on the Swedish government (Fioretos, 1997: 295-7 and 311 ). Ingebritsen, adopting a similar approach in her analysis of Nordic countries and EU enlargement, concludes that 'the political influence of leading sectors defined the capacity of governments in each state to pursue political integration ' (1998: 152) . In the case of Sweden, she identifies manufacturing -export-oriented and dominated by TNCs -as a leading sector.
However, there are three main problems with these attempts to incorporate global structural change in the analysis of states' behaviour in the global economy in general and EU enlargement in particular. Firstly, both Fioretos and Ingebritsen underestimate the continuing importance of labour in the process of further integration. Labour is regarded either as being constrained by the changes in the international economy in the way governments are (Fioretos, 1997: 302) , or as being a monolithic domestic actor that has become part of the pro-EU alliance in Sweden as a result of the structural power of manufacturing (Ingebritsen, 1998: 147-9) . This is to overlook the rift in Sweden between transnational sector unions and national sector unions over membership. Moreover, the importance of transnational labour in the successful pro-EU referendum campaign is not acknowledged (Bieler, 1999) .
Comparative political economy approaches do not by default underestimate the role of labour. Josselin's (2001) comparative analysis of British, German and French unions' positions on EMU is a good example of a clear focus on the role of labour. The second main problem, however, is that these approaches do not take account of the partial transnationalization of countries' production structures as a key aspect of globalization. As a result, trade unions (and employers' associations) are merely regarded as domestic interest groups responding to global restructuring pressures (Josselin, 2001: 55) . They are not understood as being part of these restructuring processes and therefore potential international actors. Industrial relations literature in general, as a subgroup of comparative politics approaches, neglects the international dimension through its often exclusive focus on different national industrial relations systems and their countryspecific features. This is visible in the way research publications are structured. 'Comparative industrial relations texts tend towards country chapters topped and tailed with overviews focusing on similarities and dissimilarities' (Haworth and Hughes, 2002: 67-8; see Ferner and Hyman, 1998 as an example of this problem). Nevertheless, globalization as a new phenomenon is first and foremost characterized by the transnationalization of production, not merely by increasing levels of economic interdependence. TNCs clearly differ from export-oriented companies, where production facilities are still located at the national level and which, consequently, manoeuvre predominantly in one specific domestic context. Capital and labour related to TNCs are international actors that potentially operate simultaneously within several different domestic arenas as well as at the international level. This is nowhere more important than in Sweden. Swedish production has always been characterized by TNCs. The degree of transnationalization, however, increased dramatically in the second half of the 1980s, when there was a dramatic upturn in outward FDI. While inward FDI had risen from US$ 396 million in 1985 to US$ 2,328 million in 1990, outward FDI increased from US$ 1,783 million to US$ 14,136 million during the same period (Luif, 1996: 208 ' (1995: 136) . What is therefore overlooked is the apparent separation of state and market as a historically specific condition due to capitalism and the way the social relations of production are organized around private property. As a result, the extraction of surplus labour is not directly politically enforced, because those who do not own the means of production are 'free' to sell their labour (Holloway and Picciotto, 1977: 79; Wood, 1995: 29, 34) .
1 This criticism can also be applied in the case of comparative political economy approaches. Understanding the sectoral orientation of unions, for example, as one independent explanatory variable next to variables such as inter-union competition, union-party relationship and historical attitude on European integration (Josselin, 2001: 56-9 ) implies an empirical pluralism, which is to fall into precisely the trap of separating the state from the market and the political from the economic in an ahistoric way. Instead of understanding these various factors as different forms/expressions of the very same social relations of production, they are treated separately with no inner linkage. As a result, 'state' and 'market' are reified, and it is consequently impossible to consider the internal relationship between the 'state' and 'market' -the way, for example, private property is legally ensured by the state -as well as to explain structural change beyond this apparent separation. Josselin's analysis of EMU thus remains within the realm of the given and can only assess whether the unions are in favour of European integration in general and EMU in particular (2001: 71) . What cannot be analysed is the social purpose underlying union actions. Therefore, the question of what kind of EU trade unions aspire to in relation to neo-liberal restructuring, one of the core tasks of this article, remains untouched.
Taking a neo-Gramscian perspective can help overcome the limits of comparative political economy approaches. Based predominantly on the work of the Italian Communist Antonio Gramsci, it was introduced by Robert Cox in two seminal articles in the early 1980s (1981 and 1983) .
2 The neo-Gramsci perspective concentrates on the sphere of production as a starting point for investigation and identifies social forces as engendered by the production process as the most important collective actors (Cox, 1987: 1; 1989: 39) . The separation of state and market is avoided through the realization that both are expressions of the same configuration of social forces. Capital, the owners of the means of production, is opposed by labour, forced to sell its labour-power. There are, however, further differences within the capitalist mode of production. Owing to the transnationalization of production and finance, new transnational social forces of capital and labour have emerged as significant actors. A basic distinction can therefore be drawn between transnational social forces of capital and labour, engendered by production sectors that are organized on a transnational scale, and national capital and labour stemming from national production sectors (Bieler, 2000: 9-12; van Apeldoorn, 2002: 26-34 ). Cox identifies a further split between established labour, mainly employed by TNCs with privileged conditions, and non-established labour, with part-time and other atypical work contracts in the periphery of the labour market (Cox, 1981: 135) . To avoid economic determinism, neo-Gramscian perspectives focus on class struggle as a heuristic explanatory device (Cox with Sinclair, 1996: 57-8) . While actors are always constrained by their structural environment, the focus on class struggle implies that there are always several potential strategies actors can choose from and that, by extension, future development is open-ended (Bieler and Morton, 2001b) . Finally, as a critical theory, neoGramscian perspectives accept that every approach has a normative purpose (Cox, 1981: 128) . This critical theory dimension is used to assess the social purpose underlying trade union positions on EMU in view of the future EU they aspire to (Bieler, 2000: 8; van Apeldoorn, 2002: 11-13) . This is drawn upon in the conclusion, when I assess the implications of union positions for the Swedish and EU model of capitalism.
In accordance with the neo-Gramscian identification of social forces through an analysis of the production structure, it can be concluded that the main line of division in Sweden is likely to be between national and transnational forces of capital and labour. The following hypothesis can be formulated as a result: trade unions that represent workers in transnational production sectors are likely to support Swedish EMU membership, partly because they support the companies on which their own well-being depends and that benefit from a stable monetary environment and institutionalized free trade within the EU, and partly because they realize they have lost control over capital at the national level and are therefore prepared to accept common EU policies. Mainly for the latter reason, they are also likely to engage in more extensive cooperation with other trade unions at the European level to regain some of the control over capital lost at the national level. This was precisely the rationale behind the support for EU membership by Swedish transnational sector unions in 1994 (Bieler, 1999: 38) . National production sector unions, on the other hand, are likely to oppose EMU, since it undermines national policy autonomy, the support on which their economic sectors depend. Relying on the state, they may also be less concerned about European cooperation. However, an analysis of production structures only allows us to identify the specific social forces as core actors, and the wider structural environment within which they operate, as well as to formulate hypotheses. It does not imply that the identification of an actor's location in the production process determines its actual behaviour. To uncover the actual positions and activities of unions is the task of an empirical investigation. I now turn to Swedish trade unions in order to test the hypothesis through an empirical assessment, first of their positions on EMU and then of their attitudes towards European cooperation in view of neo-liberal restructuring.
Swedish Trade Unions and the Question of EMU Membership 3
There are three main peak trade unions in Sweden. The LO organizes bluecollar workers and lower non-manuals. The TCO organizes white-collar employees, while the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO) mainly represents university-trained professionals. All three peak associations consist of a range of affiliated unions which have gained in independence since the 1980s. The LO and TCO are organized according to the industrial principle, while SACO follows the craft principle. During the 1950s and 1960s, collective bargaining in the private sector between the employers and LO set a solidaristic wage for the whole economy, including the private and public sectors. From the late 1960s onwards, however, the public sector unions within LO as well as the TCO and SACO gained in importance as a result of a rapid expansion of the service and public sectors. TCO and SACO affiliated unions started their own wage-bargaining with employers (Ahlén, 1989: 331-6 ). This shift in importance from the LO to the TCO and SACO is also reflected in changing membership levels. The LO is still the strongest union, but its membership has now fallen below the 2 million mark with 1,918,800 members in March 2003. The TCO and SACO have gained steadily over the years with the TCO now having 1,276,027 and SACO 537,500 members (Eironline, 2003) . On the basis of an internal report on EMU (LO, 1996) , the LO executive board decided against membership in February 1997. It was concerned about the potentially deflationary implications of EMU. 'The timetable is rigid and the convergence criteria doubtful. According to estimates the convergence criteria will cost many jobs and be a contributory reason for recession in Europe' (LO, 1996: 10; see also Bieler, 2000: 103) . At its congress in 2000, however, the position was re-assessed and a conditional 'yes' formulated. Politically, the strongest concerns were voiced about the danger of remaining outside the inner decision-making circle of the EU as a non-EMU member (LO, 2000: 3) . Economically, membership would help the Swedish economy to retain competitiveness, as it most likely implied slightly lower interest rates in the long term and even more room for a national fiscal policy (LO, 2000: 4-5) . The LO is still concerned about the convergence criteria and the neo-liberal orientation and undemocratic nature of the ECB. Nonetheless, outside EMU, Sweden may have to pursue an even tighter monetary policy, and the ECB would imply that some supranationality was the price to be paid for increased political influence within the EU (LO, 2000: 3, 5) . The most important conditions for the union's support for EMU deal with the possibilities of how to counter asymmetric shocks within EMU, once adjustment via a free-floating currency is no longer possible. Membership should only be an option if a stable wage formation system is secured in Sweden and so-called buffer funds established, which could be used in times of economic recession to stimulate domestic demand. The establishment of a structural council, including representatives from trade unions and employers' associations, responsible for the economic policies in times of asymmetric shocks, is considered to be a necessary institutional safeguard in this respect (Interview No. 8) . Finally, 'if Swedish membership of the monetary union is to be regarded as legitimate, it must be preceded by a referendum' (LO, 2000: 7) . On Monday 7 April 2003 the LO executive council decided that its preconditions for EMU support had not been fully met by the government, and that as a peak organization it would therefore adopt a neutral position in the referendum campaign (LO, 2003) . This implies that a 'yes' in the referendum is less likely. It does not, however, change the shift in LO position on EMU from the mid-to the late 1990s and the related general change in the union's macro-economic outlook.
Nevertheless, in order to assess the hypothesis of this article and in accordance with the neo-Gramscian perspective, the attention has to turn to affiliated unions from the national as well as transnational sectors. Within LO, it was the Metal Workers' Union in 1997 which first came out in favour of Swedish EMU membership. The Metal Workers' Union represents workers in the transnationalized manufacturing sector, dominated by TNCs such as Ericsson, Electrolux and Volvo. Considering that the union's sector depends on TNCs which operate on the European and even global level, the union argues that it simply has to follow capital to the European level to re-establish a balance between capital and labour lost at the national level (Interview No. 4) . This argument very much echoes the union's position on EU membership in 1994 (Bieler, 1999: 36) . The convergence criteria are not considered to be a problem. If anything, they had a positive impact on Sweden, forcing it to focus on low levels of inflation and a consolidated budget, putting it now, with a budget surplus of 2%, in a position to employ more people in the public sector. The establishment of buffer funds as a safeguard against asymmetric shocks is rejected. It would make no sense to take money out of the economy in times of stable budgets. The LO condition of buffer funds is regarded as a concession to those unions in LO which are opposed to EMU (Interview No. 4) . This position is supported by the Industrial Workers' Union and the Paper Workers' Union within LO. The former organizes workers in the chemical, textile and clothing sectors, but also in pharmaceuticals, plastics and refineries. The majority of the union's members work in TNCs and even the large number of small companies in these sectors are often in foreign ownership. On the basis of a union internal report in 1999, the executive committee of the Industrial Workers' Union adopted a pro-EMU position as union policy, provided that membership was submitted to the population in a referendum. EMU membership is supported because a single currency would be better for smaller enterprises, since increased competition would have beneficial implications in the long run, and because it would bring higher Swedish price levels down to EU averages. Considering the current Swedish budget surplus of 2% and the fact that inflation is under control, the convergence criteria are no longer a worry. As long as wage formation is under control, the budget surplus will be enough as a buffer (Interview No. 5) . The Paper Workers' Union organizes workers in the pulp and paper industry. Eighty percent of production is for export, out of which 80% goes to locations in EMU countries. With 90% of union members working in cross-border companies, the sector is transnationalized to a large extent. The executive board of the Paper Workers' Union decided on a 'yes' to EMU membership in December 2000. Politically, it is argued, non-membership has damaging implications for Sweden's influence in the EU. Economically, with a majority of exports now going to EMU countries and in view of companies' decisions on where to invest, the euro and EMU have become increasingly important. Finally, Swedish wage increases are still slightly above the EU average and EMU membership would put further pressure on, and thus help with, staying in line with wage developments elsewhere (Interview No. 6).
On the other hand, the Union of Commercial Employees and the Transport Workers' Union, both affiliated to the LO, oppose Swedish EMU membership. Both have experienced some transnationalization within their sectors -in the areas of transport and the security industry in the case of the latter, and the appearance of some large chains in the retail and wholesale sectors in the case of the former. Overall, however, the members of both unions still work for small domestic companies and shops, indicating a predominantly domestic production structure. The Union of Commercial Employees took its first view of expression on EMU in 1997. Politically, the union is concerned about the loss of influence on monetary policy vis-à-vis the democratically unaccountable ECB. Economically, higher Swedish wage increases due to near full employment would require a fluctuating exchange rate to counter asymmetric economic shocks. Moreover, the convergence criteria would cause mass unemployment and the ECB would stifle economic growth due to its unnecessarily high interest rates (Interview No. 1). This position is echoed by the Transport Workers' Union, the executive board of which has decided to recommend that its members vote 'no' in the referendum. The way the ECB is set up and runs monetary policy is alleged to be undemocratic. The convergence criteria would hamper economic growth and had previously been used by the Swedish government to justify unpopular measures. EMU was likely to intensify this tendency. Finally, remembering the 1992 Swedish currency crisis, when the rigid peg of the Swedish krona to the Ecu had cost about 200,000 jobs in Sweden, the exchange rate is considered to be absolutely necessary for stabilization of the economy in times of recession. The idea that buffer funds and/or a budget surplus would be enough is not regarded as realistic (Interview No. 11) .
The situation is similar within the TCO. As in 1994, differences between and within unions affiliated to the TCO prevent an official position by the peak trade union. In 1996, a TCO committee considering EMU was split 50/50 and, since then, partly in order to avoid an open split in the union, the TCO has frequently made clear that it will not take a position.
Remaining outside the EMU entails both risks and opportunities, and the TCO affiliates differ in their evaluation of these risks. TCO as an organisation takes no stance on the issue of Swedish membership of the EMU (TCO, 2001: 13).
EMU should be decided at the political level and be put to the Swedish people in a referendum (Interview Nos. 3 and 9). The majority of unions affiliated to the TCO follow the latter's position and do not take an official position. As Swedish public opinion in general, union members are deeply divided over EMU, and the outcome of the referendum is anything but clear (Lindahl, 2000) . Especially within TCO unions, there are concerns that taking a decisive stance on EMU might split the membership. Nevertheless, a split similar to the LO internal division between transnational and national sector unions can be identified. The executive committee of the Finansförbundet, representing employees in the financial sector dominated by four large, transnationally operating Swedish banks, decided in 1997 in favour of EMU. It is accepted that the convergence criteria are problematic and that disappearance of the Swedish krona implies the loss of jobs in the financial sector. Overall, however, it is assumed that EMU membership would strengthen the competitiveness of the efficient large Swedish banks and, thus, of the Swedish financial sector as a whole (Interview No. 14). SIF, the TCO affiliate organizing white-collar workers in transnational manufacturing, has not adopted an official position on EMU. Regarding itself as independent from the Social Democratic Party and having many members who are also members in other political parties including the Green and Left Parties, which are both opposed to EMU, SIF has decided that EMU is an issue which its members should decide upon independently in a referendum. It is still expected, however, that among its members as well as the executive board, there is a majority in favour of EMU, thus reflecting the transnational production structure. Similarly to the LO Metal Workers' Union, buffer funds are not considered to be feasible. Instead, labour costs need to be kept under control and a budget surplus is deemed to be the best possible buffer in times of economic recession (Interview No. 13). On the other hand, although no official positions have been taken, public sector TCO unions are more sceptical. ST, the Union of Civil Servants organizing state employees at the national level, for example, is worried about the impact of the convergence criteria on public services, and fears that EMU could prevent the necessary expansion of the public sector after years of restructuring and job cuts (Interview No. 7). Similarly, the Lärerförbundet, organizing teachers in the public sector, acknowledges that the convergence criteria pose a threat to the funding of public education. Individual members of the union's executive board have made strong statements against EMU and it is assumed that a majority of members share this position (Interview No. 3).
SACO, finally, is the peak trade union which most strongly supports EMU. As early as 1997, SACO recommended that its members support Swedish EMU membership from the start, without linking this endorsement to a range of conditions. Remaining outside implied that Sweden lost the chance to participate in formulating the rules. Moreover, economic stability resulting from EMU membership was regarded as essential if employment levels were to be increased.
A risk with being outside EMU is that the stability is easily disturbed by different market reactions, which in turn makes it even more difficult to achieve that kind of trustfulness and stable capital costs that business and households need. (SACO, 1997) [translation by Åke Zettermark] SACO is not worried about the convergence criteria. Rather, it criticizes Sweden's big spending on labour market policies, which are regarded as too costly and ineffective. In order to boost the economy, Sweden should lower taxation levels to the EU average and widen the wage structure, thereby making Sweden economically more attractive. In general, a more marketoriented system is demanded that would provide people with incentives towards more education and risk-taking (Interview No. 10). The preconditions for LO support for EMU membership and the non-position of the TCO can be explained by the different positions of the various affiliated unions from different production sectors (see above). The strong, unconditional support for EMU membership from SACO, however, can be related back to the second split within the labour movement identified by Cox. SACO represents employees with academic degrees and, therefore, the most educated parts of the Swedish workforce. Its members are frequently in positions which require technical expertise and carry more responsibility, i.e. those workers with established positions at the core of the labour market. They are the ones who lose most from the compressed Swedish wage structure resulting from the relatively high progressive taxation levels. Neo-liberal restructuring as demanded by SACO, introducing more flexibility, lower taxes and larger wage differences, is likely to benefit SACO's members most. Having said this, although no individual union affiliated to SACO has taken an official stance on EMU, there are signs that especially female members working in the public sector are more likely to oppose EMU membership (Interview No. 10), thus also reflecting the split between national and transnational social forces of labour.
Briefly, the positions that the Swedish unions take on EMU reflect a split between national and transnational production sectors, and thus confirm the hypothesis. However, an analysis of the contents of transnational labour's arguments shows that neo-liberalism is less criticized. The acceptance of the neo-liberal convergence criteria and the recognition that wage development is a core factor of economic stability indicate that some neoliberal concepts have been accepted or at least are no longer considered to be a danger. SACO even demands the full-scale implementation of neoliberal policies. Is this an indication that transnational labour may no longer be interested in Swedish Model type solutions at the European level?
Swedish Trade Unions and European Cooperation
In accordance with the hypothesis, it is assumed that there is a division between national and transnational labour not only over EMU, but also over the issue of intensified inter-union cooperation at the European level. The fact that national production sector unions are sceptical about the possibilities of European cooperation confirms this part of the hypothesis. The Union of Commercial Employees cannot detect any substantial, concrete results of the Social Dimension. More international cooperation is necessary, it is argued, but only in order to strengthen trade unions at the local and national levels, since change has always come from below. Because of the different national labour legislations, tax systems and social insurance systems, the coordination of bargaining at the European level would be impossible. The transfer of union competencies to the European level is rejected outright (Interview No. 1). From the perspective of the Transport Workers' Union, the social dialogue is valued too highly. The results would be simply too meagre, and the fact that there is no right to take industrial action at the European level would significantly weaken the potential role of unions (Interview No. 11). ST and the Lärerförbundet both highlight the need for a Social Dimension, but accept that steps towards a social union have been limited so far. Both still consider the national level to be the most important one for their activities (Interview Nos. 3 and 7). The only exception is that the Lärerförbundet has maintained an office in Brussels since 1994. It is realized that EU-level policies on education have become national issues and that, consequently, the union's members need to be better informed of EU developments (Interview No. 3) .
While this reluctance about EU cooperation and the doubts about the significance of the Social Dimension by domestic production sector unions are not surprising, the position of Swedish transnational sector unions is striking. The Metal Workers' Union argues that a balance between capital and labour needs to be re-established at the European level and hopes that the Lisbon strategy, with its commitment to full employment, developed at the European Council summit in Lisbon in 2000, may offer a way of breathing new life into the Social Dimension. Nevertheless, it asserts that lobbying the Swedish government is still the most important way of influencing policy-making. Europe-wide collective wage-bargaining is rejected and the attempts at coordinating the different national wage-bargaining rounds at the European level by the European Metalworkers' Federation (see Gollbach and Schulten, 2000) would play no role in collective bargaining in Sweden (Interview No. 4). The Industrial Workers' Union acknowledges the positive developments of the Social Dimension, but points out that the multi-sector social dialogue agreements between the ETUC and UNICE were minimum agreements which had no concrete impact on Swedish conditions. Wage-bargaining and the coordination of national bargaining at the European level are not considered to be feasible. Wage formation systems, tax systems, social security systems and bargaining cultures as well as the different languages would be simply too different (Interview No. 5) . The Paper Workers' Union echoes this position. While the importance of increased cooperation at the European level is emphasized, collective bargaining of wages or other material interests is still considered to be impossible because of the different interests of various national unions in the pulp and paper industries (Interview No. 6 ). Finally, the transnational sector TCO affiliates are similarly reluctant about European cooperation. For influence on policy-making, the Finansförbundet still deems the national level to be more important in practical terms and transfer of competencies to European unions is currently not on the agenda (Interview No. 14). SIF, too, continues to concentrate on the national level and, like its LO counterpart, the Metal Workers' Union, points out that the wage-bargaining coordination attempts by the European Metalworkers' Federation have had no impact on its bargaining with the employers at the Swedish level (Interview No. 13) . In general, the willingness to engage in stronger European cooperation by transnational sector unions in Sweden is an intention for the future at best and the further development of the Social Dimension or other measures in the area of a European employment policy is not put forward as a precondition for EMU support. In a way, the discussion on EMU has been de-linked from considerations on European social and employment policies. This is also visible in the case of the LO. In 1996, it was stated that 'if a monetary union is to be discussed at all, in our opinion it must be balanced by an equally strong employment union' (LO, 1996: 64) . In order to make monetary union acceptable, the coordination of fiscal policies at the European level was demanded, with a focus on Keynesian policies across borders. This would involve some kind of transfer mechanism within the EU budget, as well as the provision of common funding 'through the EU issuing "Union Bonds" to finance public sector investments without increasing the member states' national debt' (LO, 1996: 69-70) . Fiscal expansion would need to be supported by a monetary policy which did not focus solely on low inflation. Three to 4% inflation would be a more realistic target than 2% inflation in this respect (LO, 1996: 80; see also Bieler, 1999: 34-5) . In general, employment policy needs to be equally included in the macro-economic framework of the EU and, institutionally, labour and finance ministers should be combined in one Council within the EU for this purpose (LO, 1996: 82-3) . The conditional pro-EMU conference decision in 2000, however, neither refers to the idea of an employment union, nor does it mention further development of the Social Dimension (LO, 2000) . Of course, the LO continues to cooperate within the ETUC and comparison of wage developments across countries is actively supported. The Social Dimension is evaluated positively and the further development of the social dialogue at the multi-sector as well as the sectoral level demanded (Interview No. 12) . LO, moreover, supports EU-wide employment policies. Nevertheless, progress in the area of the Social Dimension and common employment policies is not made a precondition for EMU support. If at all, EMU would require less coordination of economic stimulation policies and more national room for manoeuvre to facilitate stabilization of the national economy once the exchange rate had been lost (Interview No. 8) .
Similarly to its position in 1994 prior to the EU referendum (see Bieler, 1999: 33-5) , the TCO argues that global restructuring necessitates stronger European-level engagement and a further development of the Social Dimension. 'The increasing pressure by globalisation makes it necessary to defend and develop the Swedish model, and we can use Europe as a platform in this work' (TCO, 2001: 11) . This too, however, is not linked to the debate on EMU. Additionally, the TCO and SACO were the only national unions at the 1999 ETUC meeting in Helsinki to reject the European coordination of national wage policies (Interview No. 12 ). This may have been partly due to a misunderstanding of what was meant by coordination, implying a stronger commitment in the eyes of the TCO and SACO than was actually meant, but it may also have been a sign of real reluctance to engage in meaningful cooperation (Interview No. 3) . In general, the whole debate in Sweden about EMU oscillates around the question of how to stabilize the national economy as an EMU member in times of economic recession. Transnational sector unions argue that a budget surplus is enough; some argue in favour of additional buffer funds; and those unions opposed to EMU argue that retaining the exchange rate was essential. The possibilities of how to generate economic growth and jobs at the European level are not explored in the discussion on EMU (Interview No. 6).
As Thelen (2001: 71-2) has recently pointed out, globalization may lead to a deregulation of national industrial relations between employers' associations and trade unions, implying pressure on trade unions to move to the European level in exchange, or to a strengthening of national industrial relations systems. In order to explain the reluctance of Swedish transnational labour to cooperate more extensively at the European level and to demand concrete further development of the Social Dimension as a major precondition for EMU support, in the next section I analyse the Swedish form of state, the developments in the area of industrial relations and the interaction between employers and trade unions.
The Swedish Form of State: a Strategic-Relational Approach to the State
It is now generally accepted that discussions about the convergence of states as a result of globalization pressures (e.g. Ohmae, 1995) have been premature. States continue to be characterized by different national institutional set-ups (Hay, 2000) . While institutional explanations fail to take account of the importance of the underlying class structure (Coates, 2000: 176-7) and are in danger of reducing explanations of state behaviour to its institutional set-up at the expense of a focus on agency (e.g. Fioretos, 2001 ), a neo-Gramscian perspective has to incorporate the institutional dimension if a complete analysis is to be attained. In principle, a neo-Gramscian perspective is open to the problematization of national institutional set-ups. While it does not regard these factors as independent variables, a neoGramscian perspective accepts that social forces operate within and through different forms of state (Cox, 1989: 41) . What is missing, however, is a conceptualization of the structural impact these institutions have on social forces. To overcome this shortcoming, I suggest that the neoGramscian perspective be combined with Bob Jessop's 'strategic-relational' approach to the state. As an institutional ensemble the state is the framework within which various different strategies are possible. As such, however, the state 'can never be considered as neutral. It has a necessary structural selectivity' (Jessop, 1990: 268) favouring certain social forces and strategies over others. Throughout the post-war era, Sweden was praised for its progressive economic-political model, which successfully combined international economic competitiveness with generous compensatory mechanisms at the national level to soften the impact of constant structural adjustment (Katzenstein, 1985) . Unions have traditionally had a strong access to policymaking. Firstly, this was based on their close contacts with the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP), especially as far as the LO was concerned, at the membership and leadership level (Sainsbury, 1991: 40) , but also to some extent in relation to the officially independent TCO. Secondly, the Swedish Model was based on a corporatist policy-making system ensuring the close involvement of trade unions and employers' associations in economic and social policy-making with the main goal of full employment (Heclo and Madsen, 1987) . Collective bargaining took place at the national, multi-sectoral level, with LO on the trade union side and the Confederation of Swedish Employers (SAF) on the employers' side setting a 'solidaristic' wage across the whole economy (Ryner, 1994: 400-1) . The state supported this social partner interaction through an active manpower policy, facilitating the transfer of workers from declining to expanding industrial sectors (Esping-Andersen, 1985: 229-31) , and through an expansion of the public sector especially in the 1970s to absorb labour set free by private sector industry restructuring (Heclo and Madsen, 1987: 165-6) . At the beginning of the 1990s, this favourable position of the institutional set-up within the Swedish form of state, which had given unions privileged structural access to decision-making, changed dramatically. First, the SAF withdrew from collective bargaining in the spring of 1990 (Pontusson, 1995: 39) . Then the SAP government abandoned full employment as its main policy goal, replacing it with low inflation (Notermans, 1993: 148;  for an analysis of the demise of the so-called Swedish Model, see Bieler, forthcoming; and Ryner, 2002: 123-58) . In 1991, when a coalition government led by the conservative Moderate Party came to power, possibilities for trade unions to influence policy-making were at an all-time low. SAP returned to power in 1994 but continued with its focus on low inflation and a consolidated budget as its main priorities. Some austerity measures were pushed through parliament against LO's will. The 1996 Congress in particular was one of conflict with the government over changes in the labour law (Interview No. 8) . In the arena of industrial relations, talks on a 'Pact for Growth' between the SAF and the TCO, SACO and LO failed on 16 December 1998, when the latter refused to sign the final SAF document. While the LO was unhappy about the lack of commitment by the employers to multi-sector centralized wagebargaining, the SAF wanted to prevent the LO from regaining a stronger position as central organization (Eironline, 1999; Stephens, 2000: 11-12) .
Clearly, full restoration of the Swedish Model is extremely unlikely, even under continuing Social Democratic governments.
The failure of these talks, however, does not imply that Swedish industrial relations have been completely deregulated and social partnership has not been revived. The Engineering Employers' Association (VI), representing employers in the transnational manufacturing sector, would have preferred further decentralization of wage-bargaining towards cross-collar agreements at the firm or divisional level (Mahon, 1999: 134) . Nevertheless, VI was isolated within the SAF in this respect, there was resistance within the VI by smaller companies, and unions did not respond positively towards decentralization of bargaining either. Finally, VI itself felt the disadvantages of decentralization, when a higher wage settlement in the paper and pulp industry in 1995 forced VI to settle with the Metal Workers' Union at a similarly high level (Thelen, 2001: 87) . Hence, transnational employers retained a commitment to sectoral wage bargaining. However, not just transnational sector employers were in favour of a revival of sectoral bargaining, the unions were, too. This can only be understood against the background of favourable economic development, as reflected in economic growth of up to 4% in the second half of the 1990s (OECD, 2001: 23-4) , and a resulting changed position by the unions on inflation. Once the Swedish Social Democratic government had decided to focus on low inflation as a main policy target and renounced the possibility of a devaluation of the Swedish krona in order to restore competitiveness of the Swedish economy, there was pressure on wage formation not to lead to higher agreements than in neighbouring countries. Hence, nominal wage increases were much lower than in the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, owing to low inflation levels (consumer price index) of under 2% between 1996 2% between and 2000 2% between (OECD, 2001 , real wages actually increased, while large nominal wage increases in the past had generally been crowded out by high inflation. Suddenly, low inflation levels were regarded as positive. This favourable assessment was further supported by the fact that Sweden, despite its policy of consolidated budgets, managed to halve unemployment from 8% to 4% between 1996 4% between and 2000 4% between (OECD, 2001 . Overall, trade unions no longer question the low inflation policy, and have accepted that it has been and will be absolutely essential to keep wage formation under control if the international competitiveness of the Swedish economy and the high levels of employment are to be maintained (Interview No. 2) .
It is therefore no surprise that it was the transnational sector unions, white-collar as well as blue-collar, which in 1997 signed an industrial agreement, updated in 1999, with their counterparts of the employers covering all private sector industries. The agreement included the formulation of common assessments of the economic situation and an agreement on rules and procedures about collective wage-bargaining at the sectoral national level, including the imposition of an impartial chair should negotiations stall. 'The purpose is to allow each party to conduct their union negotiations constructively, without industrial action, and to reach a new agreement with a balanced result before the old agreement expires' (Industrial Agreement, 1999: 2) . This Industrial Agreement was path-breaking in re-coordinating collective bargaining at the sectoral level, with one trade unionist hailing it 'the new Saltsjöbaden agreement' (Interview No. 5).
5 It was soon followed by similar agreements in other sectors. In 2000, the Swedish government established a new Mediation Authority to give further support to a smoothly running wage formation system. By then, following the example of the Industrial Agreement of 1997, already '60% of the Swedish labour force [had been] covered by collective agreements that provide their own framework for mediation, and are thus excepted from the statutory rules' (Eironline, 2001) . Briefly, corporatist bargaining has been re-organized in Sweden, albeit at the sectoral level and with stronger government involvement. It is this focus on cooperation with employers over wage-bargaining at the national level against the background of a favourable economic development which explains Swedish trade union acceptance of a low inflation policy. This revived system gives transnational unions clear structural possibilities to influence policy-making within the Swedish form of state, which makes a stronger focus on EU-level developments appear less urgent. As a result, the following additional, hypothesis can be formulated: trade unions that have good structural opportunities for influencing decision-making within the national form of state are less in favour of the establishment of an industrial relations system and social regulations at the European level to counter global pressures even if they represent transnational social forces of labour. Swedish transnational labour is a clear case confirming this hypothesis.
Conclusion
The analysis of Swedish trade union positions on EMU has confirmed the first part of the main hypothesis. Unions that organize workers in transnational production sectors support Swedish EMU membership. They argue that their companies depend on the euro and therefore require membership. Considering that inflation was under control, the convergence criteria are not considered to be a problem provided the wage formation system remains stable. Politically, membership would be necessary to gain full influence within the EU. Finally, to stabilize the economy in times of recession, the 2% budget surplus would be enough. Buffer funds are not needed. On the other hand, domestic production sector unions reject EMU membership. The undemocratic nature of the ECB is criticized and its policies along with the convergence criteria are accused of hindering economic growth and of causing unemployment. Retaining the exchange rate is considered to be essential for ensuring a stable economy. In short, in relation to EMU, a split between transnational and national labour can be identified. The unconditional support for EMU membership by SACO confirms the assumed closely related split between established labour, often employed in positions with responsibility in TNCs, and non-established labour in the periphery of the labour market.
Nevertheless, the second part of the main hypothesis has not been confirmed. Not only national sector unions are reluctant to engage in European cooperation. Transnational sector unions too do not emphasize cooperation with other unions and further development of the Social Dimension at the European level counter to their intentions in 1994. This leads to a second hypothesis, namely that even transnational labour would continue to concentrate on the national level so long as there are good structural possibilities within the form of state to influence policy-making. This has been the case in Sweden since 1997 when collective wage-bargaining was re-established at the sectoral level.
This leads to the final question of the article. What is the underlying social purpose of unions' positions on EMU and Europe-wide cooperation, and what does this imply for the future development of the Swedish and EU models of capitalism? As for Sweden, EMU membership would clearly further narrow down national possibilities of demand-oriented policies. A 'no' in the referendum would therefore be a clear decision against further neo-liberal restructuring of the Swedish form of state. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how in practice the exchange rate could ever be more than an adjustment tool. As a small, open economy, highly interdependent with the EMU economies, it is unlikely that Sweden could successfully conduct Keynesian policies such as lowering interest rates or investment via large budget deficit spending, without having to endure either high inflation rates or to devalue its exchange rate periodically. Arguably, national Keynesian policies are only feasible within a related macro-economic framework at the wider EU level.
Even within EMU, demand-led strategies are conceivable, provided a larger common budget for public investment was made available, the ECB became politically accountable and its primary target of price stability was replaced by growth and employment. British unions, for example, regard EU regionalism as a possibility for progressive alternatives to neo-liberalism. They have adopted Euro-Keynesian macro-economic management as a new project, based on an ultimately centralized fiscal and monetary policy in a federal union and combined with EU social partnership industrial relations (Strange, 2002: 356-7) . This option is not helped by national Swedish labour. Through their focus on the national level, national sector unions are unlikely to have an impact on the EU model of capitalism. Transnational sector unions are not likely to contribute either. As one interviewee outlined, 'from the trade union side, we are all good Keynesians' (Interview No. 6). Swedish transnational and peak association trade unions still stress the importance of European cooperation in this respect. Nevertheless, in practice the fact that the EMU debate has concentrated on how to stabilize the national economy within EMU indicates that the European dimension has become much less relevant. There has been little new impetus in the struggle against neo-liberal restructuring and for Keynesian, employment oriented policies from transnational Swedish labour within the EU. In this sense, transnational Swedish labour has not followed up its intentions of 1994 of working towards Swedish Model solutions at the European level. This is at least partly the result of transnational labour's acceptance of some neo-liberal concepts within the Swedish form of state. It is accepted that wage formation is responsible for national economic competitiveness and, therefore, must not lead to higher wage increases than in other EU countries. This implies, however, a tendency of regime competition contradicting trade union efforts to coordinate wage-bargaining across borders to avoid wage dumping. Moreover, the acceptance of low inflation as the main policy goal endangers the possibilities of Keynesian policies in the future. In the current situation, with a budget surplus of 2%, Keynesian deficit spending is theoretically still possible despite tight budgetary policies. Nevertheless, the moment there is a more severe economic downturn in Sweden, the government's hands would be tight within the current institutional set-up of EMU. In short, the transnational sector unions' position on EMU and European-wide cooperation neither preserves Keynesian policies for the national level, nor does it push for Keynesian solutions at the European level within EMU. Hence, whatever the outcome in the referendum, the possibilities for a Keynesian Swedish form of state have been further limited and the neo-liberal model of capitalism within the EU has been further consolidated.
Notes
This article was completed in May 2003, pre-dating the referendum on 14 September 2003. In the end, the Swedish population rejected EMU membership with 56% of the votes against and 42% in favour (http://www.finans.regeringen.se/ emu/english/referendum/index.htm;10/10/2003).
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1. For a wider engagement with this argument, see Bieler and Morton (2003) . 2. Since Robert Cox's path-breaking work in the early 1980s, a whole range of related yet different neo-Gramscian perspectives has been developed. For an overview, see Bieler and Morton (2004) . The plurality of perspectives is important, since it avoids the formation of a school of thought and the related loss of critical theoretical development (Morton, 2001) .
3. Most of the empirical material for this article has been collected through elite interviews with trade union representatives in June 2002. Interviews have the advantage of providing an insight into the internal decision-making process of a union in contrast to policy documents, which only state the outcome of a debate. The validity of information was cross-checked through the information from other interviews as well as the consultation of further primary and secondary printed sources. 4. It is important not to treat public opinion as a separate explanatory factor in addition to union positions, since this would be falling into the trap of empirical pluralism criticized above. Rather, trade unions are an expression of public opinion through the representation of their members' views.
